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The Chimera of Colorful Revolution
in Macedonia: Collective Action in
the European Periphery
La chimère de la Révolution des couleurs en Macédoine : action collective à la
périphérie de l’Europe
Biljana Vankovska
1 Macedonia, as a hardly known part of ex-Yugoslavia at the European periphery, has
rarely made Western headlines except for the security problems too often associated
with the region and the country’s bizarre “name issue.”1 Yet for a brief moment in
2014-2016, it seemed as if a sudden upsurge of social movements and popular protests
would put it on the world map of countries experiencing collective actions and calls for
radical  social  change.  Many saw this  upsurge  as  an  encouraging  development  in  a
country burdened by democratic deficit and a hybrid illiberal regime, hoping that it
could be part of a “Balkan Spring” (with similar events occurring in Croatia and Bosnia-
Herzegovina).2 The developments became especially widely known because of the final
act  of  the  performance  –  the  so-called  Colorful  Revolution  (CR)  of  2016  –  when
protesters used paintballs of diverse colors to shoot official buildings and monuments.
However, the collective action stopped abruptly in mid-2016, as societal energy dried
up like rain water in a desert. 
2 This study sheds light on the reasons for and the context of  the sudden surge and
deflation of popular mobilization, as well as the general effects of the events as seen
from  the  distance  of  five  years’  time.  The  text  structure  is  determined  by  the
predominantly  socio-historical  approach of  the  analysis:  the  first  part  sketches  the
historical context with special emphasis on the way Macedonia has been governed –
both internally and externally – since the breakup of Yugoslavia in 1991. Its aim is to
present the main features of the political and institutional landscape before the phase
of collective actions began in 2014. The second part focuses on the specific grassroots
movement in which multiple plenums formed (plenumization),  while the third part
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questions the very nature of  the Colorful  Revolution,  its  end and after-effects.  The
conclusion summarizes what the study reveals about collective action.
3 The main hypothesis is that in spite of the apparent authenticity and compliance with
the key elements of a grassroots social movement which is still the dominant position
in the academic literature on this case,3 the CR was more of a “template revolution” as
conceptualized by Sussman and Krader,4 and similar to the “colored revolutions” in
other post-socialist countries.5 In other words, the “protesters” employed an already
existing template for  fostering government change that  also preserved the existing
system for ethnic power-sharing and a neoliberal model of government. The study does
recognize  citizens’  inherent  need  and  ability  to  mobilize,  but  also  underlines  the
limitations to the form of their mobilization that is set by a restrictive political model.
This  model,  the  template  revolution,  relies  on  elites  bargaining  and  continuous
international state-building interventions rather than on people’s sovereignty. 
4 From a methodological point of view, the study represents a combined explicatory and
empirical  analysis  which  draws  mostly  on  primary  sources  such  as  public  appeals,
declarations and publications related to the events prior to and during the CR. It also
draws on a number of semi-structured interviews with movement participants. For a
researcher to be present on the scene as a participant-observer is both an asset and an
obstacle. Such a study offers an insider’s observation through an academic eye: few
have opportunities to study the evolution of phenomena on the ground (in vivo) over
many years.6 On the other hand, scholars who live within a designated context (and feel
the effects of any action) are often considered biased, especially if their views do not
conform to the prevailing political and academic narrative. The CR is still a dubious
object of  scholarly research,  and local  critical  researchers risk being disqualified as
partial and even anti-European. However, any scholar analyzes phenomena and draws
conclusions from his or her own theoretical and grounded position. One of the most
important challenges might be proving one’s detachment and neutrality regarding the
research object. As a scholar, I rely on the premises of critical theory as expressed by
Robert Cox’s dictum that “theory is always for someone and some purpose,” and “there
is no such thing as theory in itself, divorced from a standpoint in times and space.”7 
This dictum rings more true than ever in the post-Yugoslav and post-socialist context
of the newly independent Macedonia after 1991.
 
Setting the scene: uncharted territory of active
citizenship and protests in Macedonian history
5 For  the  major  part  of  the  international  audience  (including  academia),  Macedonia
remains terra incognita, partly because of its peripheral nature to European and global
affairs, but also because of a set of problems related to its existence that compromises
full  recognition  of  its  sovereignty.  These  problems  begin  with  the  naming  of  the
country and include the internationally-sanctioned questioning of the very existence of
the Macedonian nation (as demos and ethnos), its language and history. However, these
tensions should not be seen as a Balkan family problem because they involve much
more  powerful  actors.  Though  ostensibly  peripheral,  Macedonia  occupies  a  critical
geopolitical position; it is a multipolar microcosm where global faultlines collide.8
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6 The aim of this section is only to set the scene of the political and historical context of
the collective action in 2014-2016. It cannot provide a complete country background,
but even the briefest portrayal of the country consists of the following facts: Macedonia
gained independence from socialist Yugoslavia in 1991 in a uniquely peaceful way, with
not a single victim or bullet shot – therefore it was known as an “oasis of peace” – until
the myth of (negative) peace shattered. It is a small country on the southern European
periphery with approximately  two million inhabitants,  although we do not  know a
more accurate number because the 2011 census was never completed.9 It is alleged to
contain  an extraordinary  ethnically  mixed  population  that  merits  the  name
“Macedonian  salad,”  but  in  reality  the  state  is  bi-national,  shared  by  ethnic
Macedonians (65%) and ethnic Albanians (25%) (according to the 2002 census). It is one
of the economically poorest states in Europe (and may become worse in this time of
pandemic). 
 
The post-socialist transition in the Macedonian “oasis of peace”
7 Statehood and the  right  to  self-determination  of  the  Macedonian  people  are  to  be
traced  back  to  the  formation  of  the  Macedonian  Socialist  Republic  as  one  of
Yugoslavia’s six constituent republics (1944). Generations of Macedonian citizens grew
up  with  no  awareness  of  dissidence.  Tight  security  control  and  the  network  of
informants prevented any such attempt, and many innocents were collateral damage of
the disciplining exercises.10 Even the 1968 student protests in Yugoslavia, remembered
as something exceptional, did not echo much in Macedonia. However, the very same
political  context  in  which  the  socialist  republic  existed  until  1991  has  propelled
different  experiences,  constitutional  status  and  perceptions  among  the  two  major
ethnic groups' national mythistory.11 For the ethnic Macedonians, the socialist republic
and the recognition of the Macedonian language as one of the three official ones in the
new federation was an emanation of a long-lived dream for statehood, while the ethnic
Albanian  history  glorifies  episodes  of  mass  protests  against  discrimination  and
demands for the right of self-determination. Indeed, in Yugoslav constitutions, certain
rights were recognized only for the Slavic “constituent nations” of the federation, not
for  the  national  minorities  like  the  Yugoslav  Albanians.  Macedonia  gained
independence by a popular referendum held on 8 September 1991. The overwhelmingly
positive  result  of  the  referendum  was  clouded  only  by  the  fact  that  the  ethnic
Albanians  boycotted  it.  They  did  not  want  the  status  of  minority  in  the  new
independent state. Nevertheless, the international community that was failing to avert
the development of conflict everywhere in the war-thorn region of former Yugoslavia,
saw the new republic as an “oasis of peace” and a “beacon of hope.” In spite of such a
rosy picture, an almost endless list of problems has accompanied Macedonia’s state-
building efforts since 1991. These include, to mention just a few, an extremely weak
economic  base,  an  almost  non-existent  state  and  lack  of  democratic  traditions,  an
underdeveloped political culture as well as a dominant gun culture, and a turbulent
geopolitical  neighborhood.  While  Macedonia  has  handled  all  of  these  problems
comparatively well, many issues remained undeniably unresolved. 
8 The  strong  impact  of  ethno-nationalist  violent  conflicts  in  the  region  played  an
important  role  in  determining  the  character  of  conflict  prevention  efforts  in
Macedonia.  These  paid  overwhelming  attention  to  the  country’s  ethnic  mix  as  an
“explosive Macedonian salad.” For a period of ten years (1991-2001), Macedonia hosted
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an array of international organizations whose projects focused on conflict prevention
and resolution or inter-ethnic dialogue. These projects paid far more attention to the
classic cliché of inter-ethnic relations than to more fundamental sources of potential
conflict  in  the  local  society.  Yet  in  spite  of  the  name dispute  with Greece  and the
obstacles on its way to full  international recognition, Macedonia was just one more
newly independent state engulfed by the latest wave of democratization. 
9 With no critical discussion whatsoever, the country overnight joined a world already
led the by TINA principle.12 The dominant mantra was that political rights had priority
over social and economic ones because it was held that personal welfare would follow
automatically as democracy took root and the country joined NATO and the EU. Srećko
Horvat and Igor Štiks give a good regional diagnosis that applies to Macedonia too: 
In spite of the rhetoric of incompleteness,  we can observe that the free market
reigns  supreme;  post-socialist  Eastern  Europe  is  fully  incorporated  into  the
capitalist world in a semi-peripheral role. In practice this means the availability of
cheap and highly educated labor in proximity to the capitalist core, a quasi-total
economic dependence on the core and its multinational banks and corporations,
and  finally  the  accumulation  of  debt. On  the  political  side,  liberal  democratic
procedures formally seem to be there.13
10 Indeed, from the onset, the “primitive accumulation of capital” took a form of criminal
privatization of what used to be in societal ownership.14 It gave birth to a new capitalist
class,  and  created  a  lasting  ground  for  new  elites  and  a  deep  inequality  gap,  a
consequence  of  the  empty  democratic  façade  of  the  capitalist  transformation.  The
narrative of independence and statehood served as a sugar-coated pill  for all  those
pushed into pauperization.15 To paraphrase Michael Pugh’s diagnosis on Bosnia and
Herzegovina,  in  Macedonia  too  ethno-kleptocracies  rode  a  devastating  economic
transition with the assistance of foreign institutions.16 
 
Ethnic power sharing and international state-building
11 After a while, the enthusiasm with political pluralism and electoral democracy faded
away. The party landscape became quite simplified: once divided along ethnic lines, the
two major ethnic communities formed bi-party systems each. The ethnic Macedonian
side was reserved for two major parties:  the Social Democratic Union of Macedonia
(Socijal-demokratski  sojuz  na  Makedonija,  SDSM) (i.e.  former communists),  and the
conservative Internal Macedonian Revolutionary Organization -  Democratic Party of
Macedonian  National  Unity  (Vnatrešna  makedonska  revolucionerna  organiyacija  -
Demokratska  partija  na  makedonsko  nacionalno  edinstvo,  VMRO-DPMNE).  The
Albanian  party  scene  was  also  dominated  by  two  parties:  Party  for  Democratic
Prosperity (Partija za demokratski prosperitet, PDP) and Democratic Party of Albanians
(Demokratska partija na Albancite, DPA). The electoral outcomes would eventually take
a form of a bi-ethnic coalition, with clear domination of the Macedonian political party
in the majoritarian parliamentary system (up to 2002). 
12 The  SDSM-led  governments  (1992-1994,  1994-1998)  formed  coalitions  with  the
moderate Albanian party (PDP),  but the willingness to meet Albanian demands was
quite  modest.  The reaction came with the  1998  parliamentary  election results  that
demonstrated electoral support for the more ethnically radical option promised by the
DPA. The winning coalition of VMRO-DPMNE and DPA was not based on any consistent
policy  but  there  was  a  gradual  move  towards  a  more  inclusive  society,  addressing
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ethnic  grievances.  Yet  inter-ethnic  understanding  was  a  result  of  compromises
involving the division of spheres of business and mafia interests between the two elite
groups. 
13 The 1999 NATO intervention over Kosovo affected strongly Macedonia’s fragile inter-
ethnic balance. It became a turning point in the dynamics of the Macedonian conflict
that escalated two years later and prompted the highest level of ethnic identification
and homogenization among Macedonia’s  two largest  ethnic  groups  since  1991.  The
appearance  of  the  Albanian  paramilitary  National  Liberation  Army  (NLA)  and  the
violent outbreak came as a surprise even for the international observers. Officially, the
conflict began in late February 2001 with sporadic shootings and clashes around remote
and almost unknown villages on the Macedonia-Kosovo border. 
14 The Ohrid Framework Agreement (OFA), signed on 13 August 2001, was meant to mark
the end of armed conflict less than six months later. With the exception of the “Ten
Days War” in Slovenia, the violent conflict in Macedonia was the shortest and most
bloodless  on  the  territory  of  former  Yugoslavia.17 Again  Macedonia  became  an
international  “success  story,”  and ever  since  –  an  object  of  intensive  international
state-building.  As  in  Bosnia  and  Herzegovina,  ethnic  differences  were
constitutionalized  in  a  power-sharing  model.  The  Dayton  Agreement  got  a  “twin
brother”: the OFA18 prescribed the same medicine for the divided Macedonian society
although in a less complex (bi-national)  form.19 The side-effects of  the consociation
model are all  the same especially with regard to the societal  relations and political
culture  that  do  not  rest  on  free  citizens’  participation.  The  cartel  of  ethnic  elites,
decision-making based on double-majority rule and the quota system of recruitment
only deepened already persistent partitocracy.  The system often suffered deadlocks
due  to  the  perpetual  ethnic  bargaining,  so  the  EU/US  ambassadors  or  other
international officials facilitated the process. Instead of producing institution-building
and a democracy learning process, the outcome was the opposite: not only the political
elites,  but  also  the  general  public  developed  a  dependency  culture  relying  on  the
arbitrary power of international actors.20
15 On the eve of the first post-conflict elections in 2002, the former Albanian paramilitary
transformed into a political party – the Democratic Union for Integration (Demokratska
unija za integracija, DUI). Ever since, it has been a king-maker: no matter who was the
winner on the “Macedonian” side of political spectrum, DUI was the most popular in
the  Albanian  electorate.  At  a  glance,  it  looked  as  if  the  power-sharing  model
contributed to overcoming inter-ethnic tensions and establishing peace and stability.
Indeed, DUI proved to be quite skillful in terms of bargaining for ethnic demands with
any coalition partner: its key priority in 2004 was the ethnic gerrymandering of the
municipalities’ borders while in coalition with SDSM, and then in gaining other ethnic
concessions with VMRO-DPMNE (including the amnesty of  crimes against  humanity
and war crimes where its members were charged or suspects).21 
 
Stabilitocracy as a side-effect of international state-building
16 The coalition government of VMRO-DPMNE and DUI (2008-2016) worked perfectly well,
at least on the elite level. The international mentors were not always satisfied with the
policies and succession of crises;22 but they turned blind eyes to these for the sake of
inter-ethnic peace and intervened when necessary. 
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17 At  the  2008  NATO  summit  Greece  vetoed  Macedonia’s  membership  bid.  This
represented a political turning point, especially for Prime Minister Nikola Gruevski, the
leader  of  VMRO-DPMNE.  He  took  advantage  of  the  great  disappointment  about
international  recognition  in  order  to  strengthen  his semi-autocratic  rule.  Later  on
Macedonia would be dubbed a “captured state” in EU country reports, but throughout
the years of Gruevski’s rule, the European Commission gave generally positive country
reports and regularly recommended that accession talks between Macedonia and the
EU  should  begin.  As  long  as  Gruevski  looked  loyal  to  Western  power  centers  and
promised ethnic peace and a solution to the name dispute with Greece, he was tolerated
by Brussels. 
18 In other words, Macedonia functioned as a stabilitocracy. As aptly described by Srdja
Pavlović who coined the term:
The  core  value  of stabilitocracy is  a  conviction  that  protecting  and  promoting
Western interests is paramount.... Regimes which understand that core conviction
and  are  willing  to  protect  and  sustain  Western  geopolitical,  security,  military,
economic  or  energy-related interests  in  a  given country  are  usually  spared the
wrath of the great powers such as the United States, the UK, or the European Union.
Local  autocrats,  therefore,  can  do  whatever  suits  their  needs  in  their  private
domains. Any criticism directed towards them is usually dismissed as either sour
grapes from a political loser or an attempt by retrograde undemocratic political
forces to gain the upper hand.23 
19 Ironically, the Gruevski-style populism that developed over time was a “child” of the
unsuccessful  international  state-building  and  failed  promises  of  NATO  and  EU.
Gruevski’s  tenacious  rejection to  accept  external  pressures  to  change the country’s
name (and especially, his unexpected move to litigate Greece before the International
Court of Justice)24 made him less desirable as a Western partner. Seen previously as a
non-charismatic, technocratic leader with some economic skills and readiness to accept
all  neoliberal medicines,  all  of a sudden Gruevski turned into a national leader and
hero, at least for the vast majority of ethnic Macedonians. Identity politics carried out
through  the  “Skopje  2014”25 project  strengthened  his  political  rule  on  nationalist
grounds.  This  project  consisted  of  the  construction  of  colleges,  museums  and
government  buildings,  as  well  as  the  erection  of  monuments  depicting  historical
figures  (most  significantly,  a  monument  of  Alexander  the  Great  in  the  main  city
square).  The  project  became,  however,  highly  controversial  in  ethnic,  political  and
financial terms. It would become a feature of special significance for the 2016 Colorful
Revolution, as we will see later.
 
The occurrence: plenumization and its limits
20 The citizens’ discontent had never been a secret but it never produced alarm: it was
hardly  articulated  and  not  well  organized.  Yet  during  the  VMRO-DPMNE/DUI
government, small protests gradually became more frequent.26 Citizens protested over
a number of issues, such as “Skopje 2014,” electricity prices, police brutality, etc. In
some instances, ethnically motivated protests turned violent but remained limited (if
polarizing) in their effects. The 2012 “March for Peace” was a one-off event that tried to
bring together people from different ethnic and political groups in order to call for
peaceful  co-existence.  The  issues  and  activities  related  to  the  LGBT  community,
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women’s movement and sexual workers gained visibility due to the external support of
local NGOs.
21 The inflation of activism would usually bring together the same flock of people: NGO
activists and intellectuals promoted various agendas and spoke on behalf of different
interest groups. They were usually well-trained, well-spoken and financially sustained
by foreign donors.27 The protests were ill-attended or seen as a mere spectacle. Having
been faced with its impotence, the political opposition transformed itself into a “non-
governmental entity.”28 VMRO-DPMNE invented “counter-protests.”29 The NGO sector
was  also  deeply  divided along political  lines,  so  each party  could  rely  on its  “own
people” and civil society organizations. A 2014 survey showed that as many as 73.4% of
the respondents did not believe in the spontaneity of protests.30 As such, the political
parties had usurped not only the public space but also any form of civic engagement. 
22 The Slovenian sociologist Rastko Mocnik rightly points to systemic disempowerment all
over the region.
Protests are a complex matter. If people truly live in deep poverty, they can hardly
attend protests because they have to work in order to survive. If however there is a
significantly large group with no other choice, then it turns into a huge problem
and protests are not enough.31 
23 People gradually adjusted to structural violence and even developed skills to find a way
to bypass the institutions through illegal means, social connections and corruption.
 
Plenumization 2014/2015 – a new experience
24 In  that  context,  the  2014/2015  student  protests  erupted  as  a  very  surprising  and
powerful collective action. Nobody could anticipate the reaction to the revision of the
Law  on  Higher  Education  that  effectively  curbed  university  autonomy.32 At  first,
satirical media mocked the students’ passivity.33 The campaign started shyly in October
2014 but swiftly grew into a mass movement. The students eventually self-organized
into the Student Plenum (SP), clearly taking inspiration from similar forms of activism
in the region (mainly Croatia).
25 Their first public appearance took place on International Student Day, 17 November. It
was  met  by  disbelief  even by  the  organizers:  over  3,000  students  joined the  street
march. The second one took place on 10 December (International Human Rights Day)
and was even more impressive with over 10,000 protesters. The students echoed some
well-known slogans: “No justice, no peace” and “It was enough silence.”34 The public
called upon the students to take over the leadership because the adults had failed to
build  a  democratic  state.  When  it  was  no  longer  possible  to  ignore  them,  the
government  argued that  the  students  were  manipulated by the opposition or  were
provocateurs financed by external powers in order to incite a Macedonian Euromaidan,35
referring to the 2014 Ukrainian crisis that had been assimilated to a colored revolution.
36 The student leaders appealed to the political parties to stay out of their actions:
Our demands go beyond any party related affiliations.  As  an important  societal
actor, as students, we continuously insist on our intellectual independence, our free
and  critical  thought,  which  is  not  directed  by  any  populist  agenda  and  is  a
consequence of Reason…. Authenticity of the Plenum is invaluable, and all sides are
going to understand this sooner or later. The Piedmont of the Student Plenum are
the  arguments  that  are  not  directed  against  the  political  parties  but  against
injustice.37 
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26 It was exactly SP’s distance from the political parties that attracted citizens and gained
them admiration. A person who joined the student marches significantly commented:
“After all,  there is life out of the political parties.”38 For any such open forum, it is
usually hard to balance between calling for mass turnout and distancing oneself from
the interested political actors.  The opposition was too desperate to let the students
speak for themselves, so it soon got directly involved in the protest activities through
the university staff among its membership. 
27 The SP was quite a diverse and loose organization. Initially, in October 2014, a small
group of students of social sciences set the agenda and the rules of engagement. Former
students with some activist experience joined them and transferred their previously
gained knowledge.39 Plenums were soon organized in Skopje, and to a lesser degree at
universities  in  other  cities.  At  first,  the  students  had  to  deal  with  the  university
management  that  was  disenchanted.40 The  students  united  around  one  particular
interest – not to take extra (state) exams – but differed in many other respects. Despite
the  efforts  to  avoid  any  formal  or  vertical  structure  and  to  establish  a  leaderless
movement, in the course of time a number of students became more exposed to the
media and spoke on behalf of the others.41
28 The university staff members followed the students’ example. A Professor Plenum (PP)
was established in mid-December. In an Open Letter it appealed to the government to
include professors and students in the law-making as key stake-holders.42 Support also
came from foreign colleagues.43 Both letters fell on deaf ears: the law-making process
continued even more swiftly. The government hit back: individuals were tagged with
red  circles  in  media  photos;  many  were  exposed  to  stigmatization,  libel  and  even
intrusion into their intimate lives. Additional legal amendments imposing much higher
criteria for academic promotion took a punitive form. The measures were counter-
effective: the PP membership grew rapidly not only because of dissent but also because
of fear for one’s own academic future. The government used its old tactics and within
days a counter-plenum that supported the government was formed.44 It was an attempt
to turn academia into an internal battlefield by dividing it along political lines. 
29 The wider context was crucial for the outcome of the plenums’ work. In early 2015,
SDSM  exposed  a  wiretapping  scandal  (allegedly  gained  from  whistle-blowers)  and
released audio recordings, the so-called political bombshells, under a campaign called
“The  Truth  about  Macedonia.”  Social  unrest  was  simultaneously  growing  due  to
another reform of taxation law that stipulated that the precarious workers in general
would have to deduct up to 40% of received honoraria as tax for the state budget. The
same period witnessed mass protests against the prosecution of journalist  Tomislav
Kežarovski, who was charged with revealing the identity of a protected witness in an
article published in 2008.45 Faced with simultaneous challenges, the government took a
step back and started bargaining with concessions to each of the discontent groups. As
far as the protests of students and professors were concerned, the olive branch was
offered  by  the  prime  minister  himself:  the  law  was  suspended  just  days  upon  its
adoption in the parliament and working groups that included professors and students
from both plenums were invited to draft a new law.
30 It  seemed as  if  plenumization  had  taken  root.  It  became fashionable  to  follow the
students’ example, so journalists, pupils, parents, and other groups formed plenums.
Few really knew what the plenums meant at first. It was a new phenomenon and it
looked like a straightforward victory for active citizenship.  Yet mass plenumization
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(which would follow Bosnian experiences) soon failed; or rather, it was abandoned for
the sake of other forms of protest. 
31 Plenumization  had  shown  its  weaknesses  quite  early.  First  of  all,  the  number  of
engaged students  was  not  as  large  as  perceived in  relation to  the  total  size  of  the
student population. The constant re-negotiations among equals with different opinions
made the decision-making too slow, especially in a dynamic situation that called for
swift responses. The plenum activists did not have time to articulate a clear agenda and
final goal. The winter break at the university diminished the power of the movement,
so the protests were on hold. The internal split happened de facto when the students
had to make up their minds over the government concessions (i.e. the offer to make
working  groups  that  would  involve  all  stake-holders  in  order  to  address  the
grievances). For the radical segments in the movement any negotiation was seen as a
sign  of  weakness  and  even  as  “collaboration  with  the  enemy.”  Occupation  of  the
university  took  place  exactly  at  the  moment  when  the  negotiations  gave  concrete
results and a working group was formed to propose a new law. A symbolic “free zone”
was declared only at the Faculty of Philosophy. The students – already the public’s
darlings – appealed for help in food donations just days after the aid campaign for the
victims of the flooded areas. They were obviously not under siege: one could go home,
take bath or a meal, and then get back to the “liberated” university. The majority of
students were regularly attending classes and bypassing the protesters.46 In contrast,
the number of attendees who were not students but rather public personalities was
rising.  The  student  mobilization  had  reached  its  limit  within  a  fortnight.  Yet  the
autonomous zone was a unique experience, which gave a symbolic feeling of ownership
over the otherwise alienated educational process.
32 The PP manifested the same weaknesses. The core group also insisted on the horizontal
organization and on a decision-making process in vivo. At its peak, the PP embraced
over 500 professors (at least that was the number of signatories of the Open Letter); in
reality, only a handful of the most eager participants attended the meetings and made
decisions on behalf of all the others with no prior consultation. Hence all those who
were too busy, too old, or too far from Skopje to attend were outcast. The PP was also
supposed to be leaderless and non-partisan; in reality, many of the professors were
political  “have-beens”  and  some  were  still-active  politicians.  But  it  was  indeed
something new because for the first time ever the academic staff joined over a concrete
academic and vocational interest against other political differences. 
33 PP also came into crisis at the moment it was expected to be the most efficient. The
professors with qualifications in law and education were the ones who negotiated with
the  governmental  officials  –  and  risked  being  accused  of  treason  by  others  in  the
plenum.  Throughout  the  most  dramatic  period,  most  energy  was  wasted  on  social
media and excessive email communication. Not a simple draft of a new law had been
produced even when the government agreed to cooperation; few knew how to draft a
law or what model would fit the best.
34 The appearance of the PP on the scene at first was met with appreciation by many,
including the SP. It was supposed to be a joint struggle, but in reality it was perceived
differently  by  the  stake-holders.  Each  side  had  its  own  legitimate  interests.
Coordination at times was impossible. The students could undertake guerrilla actions
or performances that were not suitable for the professors, and vice versa. The public had
divergent attitudes towards the plenums. Free from any baggage,  the students were
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seen as heroes; the professors on the other hand became a burden or even a rival. The
students’ inclusion in the process of negotiation was a hard task because the students
could not come to a unified position within their own diverse plenums (at each faculty).
In sum, both plenums had been coping with their own identity and goals, let alone age
and  interest  divergences.  The  time  pressure  (i.e.  the  law  had  already  been  in
procedure) did not allow any meaningful deliberation. 
35 The professors and students won a partial  victory over the legislation but failed to
deliver  any  draft  law  or  to  develop  any  lasting  forms  of  deliberation  within  their
communities, let alone joint ones. The months of turbulence prepared them for the
looming political  drama.  Unlike  Bosnia  and Herzegovina  where  the  plenums had a
social  substrate  of  mobilized workers  and poor  citizens,  the  Macedonian ones  with
their narrow focus on the higher education were rather elitist.47 It  was only in the
following stage that  the protesters widened their  approach.  Yet  unlike the Bosnian
plenums  that  distanced  themselves  both  from  the  political  parties  and  NGOs,  the
protest  movement  in  Macedonia  was  led  by  NGO  activists  and  blessed  by  the
international community.
 
Friends and foes: protest movement(s) and political parties
36 Тhe  ongoing  political  crisis  escalated  on  5  May  2015.  It  overshadowed the  student
protests and amalgamated them. The trigger was the audio “bombshell” released by
SDSM leader Zaev that exposed a phone call between the Minister of Interior and her
aide over the death of young Martin Neškovski.48 The same tragic episode had already
been a trigger for 2011 protests against police brutality; four years later it was still a
highly emotional and politically mobilizing issue.49 
37 On 5 May 2015, a violent clash occurred between the protesters and the police. It was a
turning point: the political cause (regime change) overshadowed all the others.50 It also
helped set the scene for an allegedly Manichean battle. Each of the two blocks solidified
their rows: the pro-government side got the “ultimate proof” that the opposition had
been fabricating Euromaidan,  while  the opposition “proved” that  the regime was a
fascist  one  not  to  be  negotiated  with  on  moral  grounds.  Any  voice  of  reason  or
impartiality was condemned by both sides.51 
38 The umbrella protest movement “I Protest” (#Protestiram) was proclaimed on 10 May
2015 as a fusion of all existing movements and initiatives over various issues – and over
the years before it had existed.52 While it was hardly known who initiated it or how it
was  made,  #Protestiram  was  said  to  be  a  citizens’  plenum.  Its  demands  were  the
following: urgent resignation of the government; urgent release of all activists detained
after  the  5  May  protests,  and  formation  of  a  caretaker  government.53 The  student
activists  put  their  original  struggle  for  a  new  law  on  higher education  under
moratorium with a justification that it was immoral to negotiate with an authoritarian
regime.  For  a  couple  of  months  there  were  everyday  protests  in  front  of  the
government or other institutions, marches and speeches, and traffic blockades.
39 On its side, SDSM had a clear strategy: the “bombshells” were streamed every day in
order to stir up public rage over the allegations for numerous crimes committed by
government officials, and to eventually enforce the government’s resignation. For that
purpose, one more popular front was created on 8 May 2015: Citizens for Macedonia
brought together a long list of 80 well-established NGOs and well-known activists and
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intellectuals.  The  charter  was  presented  by  Stevo  Pendarovski,  professor  and  long
standing supporter of SDSM, who would later become President of the Republic in 2019.
Citizens for Macedonia overtly declared a coalition with the largest opposition party
(SDSM).54 A mass rally under the slogan “We are coming” took place on 17 May in front
of  the  government  building.  It  was  no  secret  that  the  logistics,  transportation and
everything  else  was  provided  by  SDSM.  It  was  known  that  Zaev  faced  a  logistics
problem in gathering the “biggest protest in the country’s history,” and because he
could not provide enough buses, he had to import some from Bulgaria.55 The scenario of
the  event  was  indicative:  the  first  speakers  were  two  representatives  of  the  SP  (a
Macedonian boy and an Albanian girl, which was meant to break the gender and ethnic
stereotypes), followed by a few NGO activists and intellectuals close to SDSM; the visible
absence of partisan symbols, and the knotted Macedonian and Albanian flags created a
mirage not only of a non-partisan gathering, but more importantly of a bi-ethnic one.
The  presence  of  ex-foreign  ambassadors  and  European  MPs  sent  a  message  of
international support. The key event, however, was Zaev’s speech, after which the so-
called Freedom Camp was set up. This was basically a Potemkin village of tents erected
in front of the government building. They blocked the main traffic artery until the end
of  the  already-  started  party  negotiations  with  international  mediators.  The  camp
resembled the “occupation of the university” both vis-à-vis its daily agenda and the fact
that few of its occupants stayed overnight. Eventually, everything turned into a big
spectacle:  the  “Citizens”  were  partying  during  the  warm  summer  nights,  and  the
revolution ended up in a karaoke-show with the protesters singing “The Government is
Falling.”56 
40 In parallel, VMRO-DPMNE remained loyal to its habits and organized an equally large
gathering including a counter-camp in front of the parliament building just a day after
the first  one was established.57 The scenography was nationalistic,  in accordance to
Gruevski’s message that Zaev intended to take over the government in order to change
the country’s name. 
41 At first glance, it looked as if the various fronts resisting the government differed only
in  their  methods  of  fighting.  Citizens  for  Macedonia  preferred  debates  with
professional NGO activists and politicians in the Freedom Camp, while #Protestiram
insisted on street blockades, marches, and art performances. Citizens for Macedonia
used mainstream neoliberal phraseology, though contentious symbols were displayed
all over the camp.58 #Protestiram tried to appeal to ordinary people, occasionally even
challenging the neoliberal dogma. 
42 There was, however, an important difference. The traditional political opposition had
reformulated itself as a nation-wide anti-government movement in the form of Citizens
for  Macedonia.  A  few  small  sections  from  the  earlier-formed  movements  tried  to
distance themselves on this point. A student explained explicitly that the SP had joined
the 17 May rally only on the condition that a clear distinction was made: it was not a
part of Citizens for Macedonia or any party.59 Some activists from #Protestiram argued
that the coalition of opposition parties and NGOs had suffocated the pluralism among
the resistance forces: “after 17 May the resistance entered a deep crisis. The protests
deflated and the awaited turnaround did not happen.”60 #Protestiram tried to revive
the politics of passion and to mobilize more people – but in vain. With the appearance
of Citizens for Macedonia, high politics took priority in a typical negotiation process
where international state-builders preferred to deal with party leaders. 
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43 As in all of Macedonia’s preceding critical moments, the representatives of NATO, the
EU and the US were involved in the mediation process, as were the representatives of
the four main political parties (VMRO-DPMNE, SDSM, DUI and DPA). The end result of a
two-week-long  series  of  discussions  (2  June-15  July  2015)  was  the  so-called  Pržino
Agreement.61 Officially,  it  marked the  end of  the  first  part  of  the  political  crisis.  It
foresaw participation of SDSM in a few key ministries; early resignation of Gruevski by
January 2016; a caretaker government to bring the country to parliamentary elections;
and  the  installation  of  a  Special  Prosecutor  to  lead  investigations  into  the  crimes
highlighted by the wiretapping scandal.62 A day after the agreement’s conclusion, Zaev
met  with the  representatives  of  the  coalition Citizens  for  Macedonia.  The Freedom
Camp  was  dissolved  and  the  “Citizens”  dispersed.  The  international  mediators  felt
more comfortable with politicians they could control; new ideas that may have led to a
Macedonian “SYRIZA/Podemos” were met with reserve.63 According to #Protestiram,
the inter-party political solution mediated by the internationals terminated the very
idea of protests and resistance.64 
44 However,  a  self-critical  analysis  claims  that  the  movement  was  an  ideologically
incoherent body, and the bone of contest was how close or far the activists were from
the political opposition.
The main disadvantage of the movement was in the fundamental unsustainability
of the idea of burying all differences until the fall of the regime. It became evident
that the differences were substantial  and ideological.  While some showed strong
liberal  and anti-authoritarian tendencies,  the pro-SDSM group acted in quite  an
authoritarian fashion. The constant insistence on a complete and blind support of
the  SDSM leadership,  the  “you  are  either  with  us  or  against  us”  logic,  and  the
demonization of everyone who did not give their wholehearted support to SDSM
with the derogatory “neutrals” only went to show the authoritarian tendencies in
the ranks of the pro-SDSM wing of the resistance.65
45 Having been caught into an exhausting political soap opera, the public got confused,
tired and eventually  bored by the tents,  camps,  marches and street  blockades.  The
“clicktivism”  eventually  became  the  main  form  of  activism:  the  silent  majority
preferred debating or fighting on internet social networks.66
46 The period between the Pržino closure of the political crisis in 2016 and the outbreak of
the  CR  in  2016  was  de  facto in  limbo.  The  protest  coalitions  were  disbanded,  and
activists only occasionally appeared on the scene to remind the political parties that
they  should  follow the  agreement  created  under  the  auspices  of  the  international
factors. 
 
Colorful revolution: a “colored revolution” as usual? 
47 As already seen, Macedonia witnessed a fast transformation from one form of dissent
into another in a compressed two years’ period. Apparently, there was an aggregation
of a range of erratic forms of collective action. If the original outbreaks of protest in
2014 might be compared to similar processes that had taken place previously in Bosnia
and  Herzegovina  (with  a  clear  social  background),  and  even  Croatia  (with  student
protests), the 2016 events bore clear resemblance with already seen colored revolutions
from Еastern Europe (such as Serbia in 2000, Georgia in 2003, Ukraine in 2004, and
again in 2014). David Lane enlists the elements of the phenomenon in the following
way: 
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The activities given the popular appellation of “coloured revolutions” all  had in
common  a  proposed  socio-political  transformation  intended  to  introduce
“democracy from below”.  Although differing in content,  they shared a common
strategy:  mass  protests  occurred  within  the  constitutional  framework  to  widen
forms of public participation in the regimes: they were legitimated as a movement
for  “greater  democracy”:  they  were  all  targeted  on  removing  the  incumbent
political  leaderships;  electoral  procedures,  allegedly  fraudulent,  were  a  regular
focus for the insurgents; the public gatherings were constituted from a mass base of
young people, particularly students.67 
48 The outlook and repertoire of the colored revolutions, so similar one to another, led to
a conclusion about their orchestrated operations – engineering democracy through the
ballot box and civil disobedience – the methods of which had matured into a template
for making the expected persons win the election.
49 The trigger for CR’s surge was a decision by President George Ivanov on 12 April 2016 to
interfere in the investigation process of the Special Prosecutor. The president pardoned
56 people who had been charged for involvement in the wiretapping scandal with a
pretext of “national reconciliation.” The same evening, over 4,000 protesters took the
streets of Skopje and vandalized the president’s office. This continued over the coming
days,  and  paintballs  in  different  colors,  which  would  become  a  hallmark  of  the
revolution,  were  used  for  the  first  time  on  15  April.  Ivanov’s  decision  made
#Protestiram  re-activate  after  a  period  of  hibernation.  This  time,  however,  it
announced  an  open  coalition  with  SDSM  and  the  newly  formed  far  left  party
Levica. They demanded a formation of technical government, and postponement of the
parliamentary elections that had been called for 5 June 2016, on the grounds that the
conditions for free and fair elections were not in place. The “revolution” lasted only
until the external mediators got involved again. The Pržino 2.0 Agreement, signed in
late July, opened the path to the 2016 December elections.68
50 The CR was just a metamorphosis of the already existing players. These events got the
greatest  media  coverage abroad but  the  daily  marches  failed again to  mobilize  the
silent majority. A 2016 survey of the Institute for Democracy displayed that citizens
were divided over their support for the protest movements, practically reflecting the
key  political  division  between  the  two  major  political  parties.  Fewer  than  half  of
respondents (46%) supported the protests, and 62% from within the 46% were in favor
of the CR, while 25% were supporting the VMRO-DPMNE camp.69 The “usual suspects”
(i.e.  well-known NGO activists and intellectuals from other anti-government events)
were leading the walks (with expensive bicycles and fancy pets) and taking part in the
public debates. The performances were “colorful” only visually, while in essence they
were routines that would take place for a couple of hours each afternoon on working
days, with breaks during weekends and holidays. 
51 At  first  sight,  the  CR  (Šarena  revolucija  in  Macedonian)  was  unexpected  and
spontaneous. Yet insightful analysis displays a different story. The chosen name70 was
supposed to be both descriptive and functional: it served to acquire the aura of a heroic
popular revolution against a corrupted and dictatorial regime. The buildings of “Skopje
2014” that were targeted with paintballs not only symbolized the power structures, but
also the VMRO-DPMNE and DUI identity politics attached to the project. Unlike other
colored revolutions, which opted for one color (or symbol) as their signifier, in this case
the mixture of colors was supposed to symbolize the diverse coalition of a multi-ethnic
and multi-confessional society (i.e. “Macedonian salad”). The message could be read as
The Chimera of Colorful Revolution in Macedonia: Collective Action in the Eur...
Balkanologie, Vol. 15 n° 2 | 2020
13
follows: Gruevski is a hardline nationalist, and we are all united against him, despite
our diversities, to create a new civic democracy, one society for all, with a clear pro-
Western orientation.
52 Similarities with the other colored revolutions were evident in many respects. First of
all, the repertoire of methods and actions (protest marches, student activism, guerrilla
actions,  art  performances)  all  come  under  the  umbrella  of  nonviolent  resistance.
Second, the practical and educational inspiration came from the well-known apostles of
civil resistance, such as Gene Sharp and Saul Alinsky.71 Third, the avant-garde of the
movement were notable NGO activists, the leaders of the student movement, a part of
the intellectual and cultural elite, ex-politicians and journalists. De facto NGO-ization of
the resistance took place.72 Fourth,  there was a visible use of a so-called marketing
wing.73 The  hallmark  of  other  colored  revolutions  was  in  full  use:  the  name,  the
paintballs,  the  logo  of  a  black-and-white  clenched  fist,  sprays,  a  plethora  of
promotional  gadgets  such  as  T-shirts,  printed  stickers,  flyers,  banners,  websites
mushrooming for a while and use of social media, irony and street events mocking the
regime  have  been  hugely  successful  in puncturing  public  fear  and  enraging  the
powerful.74 The commercial-type of language was deemed to be more receptive than
ideological language.75 
53 The notion of an interrelated wave of colored revolutions is, furthermore, of specific
importance  in  this  case.76 The  Colorful  Revolution  occurred,  inter  alia, because  of
transnational  ties,  learning  processes  and  the  power  of  example.77 Some  of  the
participants of the CR have spoken privately of external involvement.78 Chris Deliso, an
American expert on the Balkans, argues that such protest movements in Macedonia are
not endemic, and would simply evaporate without foreign funds.79 The media helped to
create  the  image  of  mass  and  unpaid  spontaneity,  although  Western  assistance
programs  were  pouring  money  into  the  spectacle. As  already  noted,  a  number  of
websites, initiatives and performances, including TV shows, were financed during this
critical period. As soon as the political crisis calmed down, they simply vanished from
the public space.80 
54 If  it  is  generally true that “regime collapses have resulted more from authoritarian
weakness than opposition strength,”81 the very manifestation of the  CR should be seen
as due to the inherent weakness of  the regime. Indeed,  Gruevski  was a paper tiger
caught in flagranti with the wiretapping scandal and under the simultaneous pressure of
political opposition, international power centers and the public. However, unlike many
autocrats overthrown through colored revolutions,  he could still  rely on significant
popular support that did not rest only on propaganda and dependency, but also on a
genuine belief among citizens that he was the “defender of national interests.” More
precisely,  he  was  seen as  someone who stood against  all  pressures  from abroad to
change the name Macedonia for the sake of NATO and EU membership.
55 Vicken Cheterian82 argues that the colored revolutions have been usually elite-led –
although they have depended on popular mobilization to bring about regime change.
The CR aftermath showed that the activists failed to bring popular mobilization, which
was proved not only on the 2016 December parliamentary elections but even more on
the 2020 early elections.83 In spite of everything, in 2016 VMRO-DPMNE won the biggest
number of seats, though not enough to form a government. The regime change took
place due to its lost capacity for coalition-building; DUI got a better offer and switched
sides. Thus de facto just one part of the past regime was ousted through a political and
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electoral “revolution”: while the major conservative party (from the Macedonian block)
was replaced by SDSM, the second half of the coalition, the Albanian party DUI, has
remained a king-maker to-date. DUI had been a loyal partner of VMRO-DPMNE since
2008 but few dared to call for its political or even legal responsibility.
56 Despite the huge disillusionment with the new government and the new scandals84 that
involved precisely the institutions that were expected to bring justice and peace (as the
slogan of the CR read) not only has any meaningful critical debate been missing but also
any (even the weakest) sign of collective action. After the CR and the regime change,
the country seemed to be back to square one: a new regime was installed in 2017 – with
the same deficiencies, democratic deficit and dearth as the old one – but with no real
power for dissent. The only change brought by the new government has been the new
name – the Republic of North Macedonia – and NATO membership (as of March 2020).
These  decisions  have  been  taken  against  the  will  of  the  majority  of  citizens,  as
expressed by the referendum on the name change held on 30 September 2018.85 Judging
from the results, it seems as if the whole undertaking was meant precisely to achieve
this  change  and can be  explained only  by  geopolitical  reasons:  the  removal  of  the
previous  uncooperative  government  was  a  must.86 The  shock  therapy  and  the
systematic disempowerment of the citizens was best illustrated during the 2017/2019
period when the people failed to protest against the national engineering imposed by
the EU over the change of the country’s name, identity, history and constitution.
57 The political U-turn was finished, and Macedonia (now renamed as North Macedonia)
has returned to square one, debating its history, identity and inter-ethnic issues. The
real effects of the progressive protest movements (2014/2016) can be seen only in a 
simple  regime  change.  As  a  young  scholar  and  participant  of  #Protestiram  noted:
“Gruevism” was simply replaced by “Zaevism,” and basically the political status quo was
preserved.87 
58 Today’s society in Macedonia has been going through an anti-climax when it comes to
political, electoral or social change. The disappointment has gone deeper after the leak
of four short audio tapes of Zoran Zaev, in which he is heard swearing about the people
on the eve of 2016 elections and boasting that the protest groups, “all of those Soros
funded groups, they are mine.”88
 
Conclusion
59 Despite  the  fact  that  the  analyzed  protest  movements  have  proved  to  be  just  a
temporary  episode,  the  article  stresses  the  importance  of  the  wider  historical  and
political  (including  the  geopolitical)  context  on  the  possibilities  of  a  grassroots
influence on the system. Yet the very fact  that society experienced something that
looked like a political or societal “spring” is important. 
60 The CR had been envisaged and encouraged by external factors who took advantage of
the  frustrations  and  potential  for  protest  that  had  existed  especially  among  the
younger generation and intellectual elite. This is in contrast with the attitude towards
the protests in Bosnia and Herzegovina. In the latter case, preservation of the Dayton
status quo and neocolonial status of Bosnia and Herzegovina have had priority over any
demands coming from a grassroots movement. In Macedonia, a political change (i.e.
simple regime change) was of  utmost importance both because of  the decay of  the
system and the need to speed up the process of the country’s geopolitical integration
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through  NATO.  It  is  important  to  note  that  throughout  the  analyzed  period,  the
Albanian political  parties  took part  only symbolically  in the protests  or behind the
scene. The power-sharing system is a limiting factor to joint mobilization. The activists
tried to create an image of a non-ethnic (or even all-ethnic) movement in contrast to
the alleged mono-ethnic support for VMRO-DPMNE. They, however, thus disregarded
the responsibility of DUI for everything that had been done during their common rule
over a decade. The protests are just the most visible part of a socio-historical event, and
often do not express even the deepest grievances.
61 Few  pay  attention  to  the  factors  that  systematically  disempower  the  citizens’
participation in political life. One of them is surely that within the neoliberal context,
the voters can only choose between Coca-Cola and Pepsi Cola (to paraphrase Chantal
Mouffe). 89In the power-sharing system the only choice is even more limited. 
62 The  citizens  in  their  semi-protectorates  are  certainly  never  encouraged  by
international state-builders to take active participation that goes beyond party-politics.
90 Within the existing public space, and for the sake of internal strife for power, the
political  parties have always been treated as the only capable actors for mobilizing
their  own  membership  (using  stick  and  carrots)  and  occasionally  the  citizens,  by
providing the logistics  for any mass rally.  The greatest  achievement of  the student
protests  was  precisely  overcoming,  at  least  temporarily,  a  barrier  of  distrust
concerning the potential for political leadership with the majority of citizens. Zaev’s
rule, however, has deepened the original distrust, while new generations of students do
not remember the SP protests and live and study under worse conditions than before.
63 If  resistance  is  understood  as  an  endeavor  that  undermines  dominance  as  well  as
hierarchical relationships then no resistance has taken place yet in Macedonia. The
government has changed but only within the dominant framework of a “holy alliance”
among  internal  and  external  political  elites,  market  “forces”  and  privileged  civil
society actors. The internal forces that may want to challenge the established order
face not one, but two opponents. If the citizens of the EU periphery can hardly take
their destiny in their own hands – which was displayed in Greece with the experience
of the SYRIZA-rule – then obviously states such as Macedonia belong to the super-
periphery. 
64 The CR was therefore less a “social revolution” than a “political revolution.” At the end
of the day, citizens had to make “Hobson’s choice” by accepting Zaev’s government and
everything that  goes with it.  Lack of  sufficient internal  potential  and resources for
deeper change further compromised by the guiding effects and impact of geopolitical
interests in the European periphery were key determinants. These problems are here
to stay as long as this equilibrium persists and sustains elitist positions with regard to
both neoliberal ideology and an ethnicized view of politics. 
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ABSTRACTS
This article analyzes the social movements that took place between 2014 and 2016 in Macedonia.
These events got widely known because of the 2016 final performance: the so-called Colorful
Revolution. However, their background, the main internal and international actors involved and
their  after-effects  remain  subject  to  highly  conflicting  and  underexplored  explanations.  The
main hypothesis of this article is that, in spite of its apparent authenticity as a grassroots social
movement, the Colorful Revolution was closer to what has been called a “template revolution” or
“colored revolution” and has already been seen in other parts of the world. This study draws
mostly  on  primary  sources  associated  with  the  personal  involvement  of  the  author  in  the
protests. It aims to contribute to a better understanding of events which still polarize political
and public discourse as well as social praxis in the country. 
Cet article analyse les mouvements sociaux qui ont eu lieu entre 2014 et 2016 en Macédoine. Ces
événements sont devenus célèbres en raison de la performance finale réalisée en 2016, appelée la
Révolution  des  couleurs.  Cependant,  le  contexte,  les  principaux  acteurs  internes  et
internationaux  engagés  et  les  répercussions  font  encore  l'objet  d'explications  très
contradictoires et sous-étudiées. L'hypothèse principale de cet article est que, malgré l'apparente
authenticité d’un mouvement social issu de la base, la Révolution des couleurs a été plus proche
de ce que l'on a appelé une « révolution sur modèle » ou une « révolution colorée » déjà observée
dans d'autres parties du monde. L'étude s'appuie principalement sur des sources primaires liées
à l'implication personnelle  de l'auteure dans les  manifestations.  Elle  vise  à  contribuer à  une
meilleure compréhension des événements qui polarisent encore le discours politique et public
ainsi que la praxis sociétale dans le pays. 
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